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FEDERAL COURTS-JURY TRIALS BEFORE MAGISTRATES-­
Muhich v. Allen, 603 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir. 1979). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On October 16, 1970, Dr. Dolores Muhich was appointed an 
assistant professor in the Department of Guidance and Educational 
Psychology for Southern Illinois University.1 Her contract was to 
last one year, but Dr. Muhich anticipated that it would be re­
newed. In March 1971, however, she received a letter from the 
department chairman stating that her contract would not be re­
newed. After unsuccessful attempts to secure employment else­
where, Dr. Muhich investigated the reasons for her dismissal. Sus­
pecting that her dismissal and subsequent employment problems 
stemmed from discrimination on the basis of her sex, Dr. Muhich 
brought suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Illinois. 2 After various pretrial motions at the district 
court level, Chief Judge Wise referred the matter, upon the stipu­
lation of the parties, to a United States Magistrate. 3 The magistrate 
1. Brief for Appellant at 9, Muhich v. Allen, 603 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir. 1979). 
2. Muhich v. Allen, 603 F.2d 1247, 1249 (7th Cir.), rehearing and rehearing en 
bane denied, No. 78-1817 (7th Cir. Sept. 25, 1979). 
Muhich alleged that the defendants, officials at Southern Illinois University, act­
ing under color of state law, had discriminated against her by reason of her sex, thus 
denying her the equal protection of the laws according to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) 
and the fourteenth amendment. 
3. The order read as follows: 

It is Ordered That, in accordance with Title 28 U.S.C. 636, Rule 38 of the 

Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern Division of Il­

linois, and pursuant to stipulation of the parties, this matter is referred to 

United States Magistrate Kenneth J. Meyers, for the purposes of conducting 

all proceedings, including trial and the entry of final judgment. 

Muhich v. Allen, 603 F.2d 1247, 1249 (7th Cir. 1979). The basis of this order was the 
Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (1976), which provides: "(3) A magistrate 
may be assigned such additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution 
and laws of the United States. (4) Each district court shall establish rules pursuant to 
which the magistrates shall discharge their duties." The local rule relied on in 
Muhieh was Rule 38 of the District Court for the Eastern District of Illinois which 
provides in pertinent part: "In addition to the other powers expressly provided by 
Rule 38(b), the Magistrate shall have the authority to: (c) With the written consent of 
the parties, hear and determine all motions, conduct the trial, enter findings of fact 
and conclusions of law and final judgments in civil cases." 
523 
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was authorized to conduct all proceedings, including trial and entry 
of final judgment. 4 The basis for the reference was the Federal 
Magistrates Act of 19685 which empowers magistrates to assist 
judges in an attempt to alleviate congestion in the federal court 
system. While Congress did not expressly provide for magistrate 
trials, it did allow magistrates to be assigned any additional duties 
not inconsistent with the Constitution or laws of the United States. 
As a result, a jury trial before Magistrate Kenneth J. Meyers was 
held on February 28, 1978. The magistrate granted a directed ver­
dict to members of the Board of Trustees of the University, and 
the jury found in favor of the remaining defendants. 6 Magistrate 
Meyers subsequently denied Dr. Muhich's motion for a new trial, 
and she appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit. 7 
Nearly three months after trial, the magistrate filed the "Re­
port and Recommendation" with the district court. On the basis of 
a Seventh Circuit opinionS decided subsequent to trial, the magis­
trate no longer considered his orders as final, appealable decisions 
and he urged the court to "adopt and affirm the rulings and or­
ders."9 On June 15, 1978, in Muhich v. Allen,10 the district court, 
through Chief Judge Foreman, conducted a de novo review of the 
record and the magistrate's report and affirmed both the magis-
The Federal Magistrates Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1113, modified 
the commissioner system to create the position of United States Magistrate. The 
magistrate's purpose was to assist the judge in an effort to alleviate the problems of 
delay and congestion in the federal courts. Magistrates were given express powers, 
such as that of special master, and implied additional duties not inconsistent with 
the United States Constitution and the laws of the United States. See Doyle, Imple­
menting the Federal Magistrates Act, 39 J.B.A. KAN. 25 (1970); Spaniol, The Federal 
Magistrates Act: History and Development, 1974 ARIZ. ST. L.J, 565. 
In 1976 the Congress amended the Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-639 (1976) to clarify 
the additional duties requirements. See notes 46-59 and accompanying text infra. 
In 1979 the Congress has passed further amendments to the Act in the Federal 
Magistrates Act of 1979. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 631-636 (West Pamph. 1980). See notes 
143-52 and accompanying text infra. The purpose of the new Act is to clarify and ex­
pand magistrate jurisdiction and to improve public access to the courts. Extensive 
treatment of the 1979 Act is beyond the scope of this casenote. For extensive analy­
sis see Note, Article III Constraints and the Expanding Civil Jurisdiction of Federal 
Magistrates: A Dissenting View, 88 YALE L.J, 1023 (1979). 
4. See note 3 supra. 
5. Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-639 (1976). 
6. Muhich v. Allen, 603 F.2d 1247, 1249 (7th Cir. 1979). 
7. Brief for Appellant at 8. 
8. Taylor v. Oxford, 575 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1978); see note 17 infra. 
9. Muhich v. Allen, 603 F.2d 1247, 1250 (7th Cir.), rehearing and rehearing en 
banc denied, No. 78-1817 (7th Cir. Sept. 25,1979). 
10. Civ. No. 73-770 (D. III. June 15, 1978), afI'd, 603 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir.), re­
hearing and rehearing en banc denied, No. 78-1817 (7th Cir. Sept. 25, 1979). 
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trate's orders and the jury verdict. 11 
Dr. Muhich appealed to the Seventh Circuit alleging that 
the district court's referral of her case to a United States Magistrate 
for conducting a trial was void ab initio on jurisdictional grounds. 
Also, she attacked the subsequent order by Judge Foreman as in­
adequate to cure the allegedly invalid delegation. 12 The Seventh 
Circuit held, over a strong dissent,13 that delegating a case to a 
United States Magistrate for conducting a civil trial is proper when 
both parties consent to the procedure pursuant to a local district 
court rule. The court qualified its decision, however, and said that 
the magistrate's findings must be subsequently presented before 
the district court judge for de novo review of the evidence pro­
duced at trial and the applicable law. 14 After this review, the 
judge, rather than the magistrate, is entitled to enter final judg­
ment. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The primary issue in Muhich was whether the adjudicatory 
procedure used by the district court was statutorily and constitu­
tionally infirm. The circuit court focused on serious issues raised by 
Dr. Muhich concerning the jurisdiction of the magistrate under ar­
ticle III of the United States Constitution and the failure of the 
Federal Magistrates Act of 196815 to sanction magistrate references 
for jury trials. 
In prior opinions,16 the Seventh Circuit had consistently lim­
11. In his order, Chief Judge Foreman stated, inter alia: 
This case is before the Court to review the Report and Recommendation of 
Magistrate Kenneth J. Meyers filed May 23, 1978. Neither party has filed ob­
jections to the Magistrate's Report and Recommendation, although more 
than ten (10) days has elapsed since the Report and Recommendation was 
served. The Court has reviewed the Report and Recommendation of the 
Magistrate, the transcript of the proceedings, the various motions which 
were filed during and subsequent to the trial, and the jury verdict. The 
Court is convinced after having reviewed the entire record that the Orders 
of the Magistrate and the jury verdict are supported by the evidence pre­
sented and the law applicable thereto. 
603 F.2d at 1250. 
12. [d. at 1248-49. 
13. Judge Swygert dissented on multiple grounds. See notes 34-45 infra and ac­
companying text. 
14. 603 F.2d at 1252. Judge Sprecher joined in the opinion written by Judge 
Bauer. 
The court dismissed, as without merit, appellant's additional argument that the 
cumulative effect of erroneously admitted evidence and improper argument by de­
fense counsel deprived Dr. Muhich of a fair trial. [d. at 1252-53. 
15. See note 3 supra. 
16. United States v. Raddatz, 592 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1979), cen. granted, 444 
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ited the expansion of magistrate jurisdiction, even when based 
upon consent of the parties. Dr. Muhich relied on dictum in the 
Seventh Circuit's decision in Taylor v. Oxford,17 which apparently 
limited the magistrate's trial jurisdiction. The Muhich court, how­
ever, distinguished Taylor and expanded the magistrate's jurisdic­
tion. The court decided to prohibit only the entry of final judgment 
by magistrates. IS Since the district court judge in Muhich, rather 
than the magistrate, had entered final judgment, jurisdictional re­
quirements were satisfied. 19 
The court also defended the Muhich procedure against the 
claim that it violated the article III command that the judicial 
power of the United States be vested in article III courtS.20 The 
first half of the procedure consisted of a consensual reference to a 
magistrate for a civil trial, and the second half of the procedure in­
volved a de novo review by the district court. The first half of the 
procedure had been previously recognized as constitutionally valid 
in DeCosta v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. 21 To support 
the second half of the procedure, the Muhich court relied on the 
United States Supreme Court's landmark decision of Mathews v. 
Weber. 22 Mathews required that a magistrate exercising "additional 
duties" jurisdiction must remain subject to the supervisory powers 
of the district judge. 23 The authority and responsibility to make in­
formed, final determinations, even when magistrates conduct the 
proceedings, remain with the judge. 24 Since Chief Judge Foreman 
retained jurisdiction by exercising his supervisory power in the 
U.S. 824 (1979) (No. 79-8); Taylor v. Oxford, 575 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1978); TPO, Inc. 
v. McMillen, 460 F.2d 348 (7th Cir. 1972). 
17. 575 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1978). In Taylor a different panel of the Seventh Cir­
cuit invalidated local Rule 38 as it pertains to entry of final judgment by magistrates. 
See note 4 supra. The court noted that while innovative experiments were intended 
by § 636(b)(3) of the Magistrates Act, those experiments must stay within the admin­
istrative limits of the statute. The court also indicated that consent alone cannot con­
fer upon a magistrate jurisdiction which he otherwise does not possess. Id. at 154. 
See also United Steelworkers, AFL-CIO v. Bishop, 598 F.2d 408, 411 (5th Cir. 1979). 
18. 603 F.2d at 1250.. 
19. Id. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976). 
20. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 provides: "The judicial Power shall extend to all 
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United 
States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority...." 
21. 520 F.2d 499 (1st Cir. 1975), cen. denied, 423 U.S. 1073 (1976). See text ac­
companying notes 63-75 infra. 
22. 423 U.S. 261 (1976). In Mathews the Court unanimously held that the 1968 
Magistrates Act permitted the district court to refer all social security benefit cases to 
United States Magistrates for preliminary review, argument, and recommendation 
subject to the independent decision on the record by the judge. 
23. See note 3 supra. 
24. 423 U.S. at 270-71. 
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form of a de novo review and by invoking his exclusive authority to 
order final judgment, the Muhich court concluded that the stric­
tures of article III were satisfied. 25 
The court in Muhich also rejected the plaintiff's claim that the 
Magistrates Act failed to allow magistrates to conduct jury trials. It 
found statutory support for such references in the broad language 
of the "additional duties" that may be assigned to magistrates un­
der the Act. 26 Since Dr. M uhich' s case was referred to the magis­
trate according to a local rule27 governing the discharge of the mag­
istrate's duties,28 the referral was permissible. 
As a final determination, the circuit court found no error be­
cause the magistrate's decision received de novo review by the dis­
trict court in compliance with section 636(b)(2)(C) of the Act. 29 Al­
though Dr. Muhich had not filed formal objections against the 
magistrate's report to the district court,30 Chief Judge Foreman re­
viewed the record and entered judgment accordingly.31 The circuit 
court commended Chief Judge Foreman on his exercise of discre­
tion since this review precluded any possible constitutional infirmi­
ties32 and also satisfied the final judgment requirement. 33 
25. 603 F.2d at 1251. The court contended that jurisdiction remains vested in 
the district court and is merely exercised through the medium of the magistrate. 
26. Id. at 1251. 
27. Section 636(b)(4) requires that the district courts establish local rules, pur­
suant to which the magistrates shall discharge their duties. The court placed reliance 
on local Rule 38 despite its invalidation, in part, by the Taylor court. See note 17 su­
pra. 
28. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(4) (1976). See note 3 supra. 
29. Section 636(b)(I)(C) provides: 

[T]he magistrate shall file his proposed findings and recommendations ... 

with the court and a copy shall forthwith be mailed to all parties.... 

Within ten days after being served with a copy, any party may serve and 
file written objections to such proposed findings and recommendations as 
provided by rules of court. A judge of the court shall make a de novo deter­
mination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or 
recommendations to which objection is made. A judge of the court may ac­
cept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations 
made by the magistrate. The judge may also receive further evidence or re­
commit the matter to the magistrate with instructions. 
28 U .S.C. § 636(b)(I)(C) (1976). 
30. 603 F.2d at 1252. The court correctly observed that neither party formally 
objected to the magistrate's report. Appeal of the trial findings commenced on April 7, 
1978, three days after Magistrate Meyers denied the motion for a new trial. There­
fore, Muhich objected, at least constructively, to any findings in the "Report and 
Recommendation." Brief for Appellant at 8. 
31. 603 F.2d at 1252. 
32. Id. The court cited dictum in Sick v. City of Buffalo, N.Y., 574 F.2d 689, 
692-93 (2d Cir. 1978), to illustrate that meaningful review avoids possible constitu­
tional infirmities. 
33. 603 F.2d at 1252. The court did provide room to modify this standard when 
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Judge Swygert dissented from the Muhich majority on juris­
dictional grounds and on the issue of legislative intent. Further­
more, he contended that the review was not truly de novo. 34 The 
thrust of his jurisdictional objection was against the judicial delega­
tion to magistrates of the traditional article III function of presid­
ing over jury trials. While acknowledging that Dr. Muhich had 
consented to referring her case to the magistrate, Swygert negated 
the importance of this consent. He said that parties cannot confer 
subject matter jurisdiction themselves. 35 
In discussing the essential subject matter jurisdiction, Judge 
Swygert reviewed the Magistrates Act extensively to determine if 
Congress had intended to confer upon magistrates the power "to 
accept jurisdiction and preside over jury trials. "36 He referred to 
the landmark case of TPO, Inc. v. McMillen37 to provide an analy­
sis of the Act prior to the 1976 amendments. In TPO, Inc., the 
Seventh Circuit surveyed the legislative history of the 1968 Magis­
trates Act, concluding that Congress had not attempted to devolve 
upon magistrates powers which were judicial, such as motions to 
dismiss or motions for summary judgment. Furthermore, the court 
in TPO, Inc. said that judges also do not have the power to dele~ 
gate such duties to magistrates. 38 In holding that magistrates had 
no authority to decide motions involving ultimate decision-making 
power, the court emphasized that the additional duties assigned to 
magistrates must remain within the bounds of what may be consti­
tutionally performed by non-article III judicial officers. 39 
Judge Swygert reviewed the 1976 amendments to the Magis­
trates Act which clarified and defined the additional duties legis­
countervailing constitutional considerations are present. [d. at 1251. Two examples 
were given. The first occurs when, in a criminal case, the circumstances mandate 
"extending the full measure of judicial power to the defendants." United States v. 
Raddatz, 592 F.2d 976 (7th Cir.), cen. granted, 444 U.S. 824 (1979) (No. 79-8). In 
Raddatz, the circuit court held that where the issue depended on the credibility of 
witnesses, reference of the accused's motion to suppress evidence to a magistrate 
with de novo review without hearing the evidence in question may have satisfied ar­
ticle III, but did not satisfy due process. [d. at 982. The second example given oc­
curs when parties to a civil litigation insist upon judicial resolution before an article 
III court. LaBuy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957). In LaBuy, the Supreme 
Court disapproved the referral of a complex antitrust case to a special master by the 
district judge after the judge had conducted the pretrial motions. 
34. 603 F.2d at 1253. 
35. [d. (Swygert, J.) (citing Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237, 244 (1934); C. 
WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 17 (3d ed. 1976)). 
36. 603 F.2d at 1253. 
37. 460 F.2d 348 (7th Cir. 1972). 
38. [d. at 359. 
39. [d. 
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latively assignable to magistrates. 4o He concluded that Congress 
had intended for these additional duties to be merely administra­
tive and to enable the district court judge to have more time to pre­
side at trial. 41 Congress never contemplated that the amendments 
would be considered "as authoriZing a magistrate to do all but en­
ter final judgment in a federal civil trial. "42 He contended that the 
procedure followed in Muhich contradicted the congressional in­
tent. 
Judge Swygert also argued that even if Congress had sanc­
tioned such magistrate reference, the de novo review conducted in 
Muhich did not satisfy constitutional requirements43 since it was 
not truly de novo. 44 Instead of an independent weighing of each 
situation as it existed prior to the ruling, Chief Judge Foreman 
merely reviewed the record to find evidence supporting a given 
conclusion. By allowing the magistrate to preside over a jury trial 
on the merits, Judge Swygert stated that the review could be 
scarcely other than a broad appellate review. Because the jury's 
verdict is not lightly set aside and because the judge may be reluc­
tant to re-try the entire case, the result is often merely a review to 
determine if the magistrate's rulings were arguably supportable. 45 
Consequently, Swygert stated, even if a true de novo review could 
cure constitutional defects, such a review was not present in the 
Muhich case. 
III. THE MAGISTRATES ACT OF 1976 
Judge Bauer explains that the Federal Magistrates Act, as 
amended in 1976, supports the majority's decision. 46 Contrary to 
40. H.R. REP. No. 1609, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1976), reprinted in [1976] 5 
U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 6162. 
41. Id. at 6, reprinted in [1976] 5 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS at 6166. The 
report states: 
It seems to the committee that in 1968 the Congress clearly indicated its 
intent that the magistrate should be a judicial officer whose purpose was to 
assist the district judge to the end that the district judge could have more 
time to preside at the trial of cases having been relieved of part of his duties 
which required the judge to personally hear each and every pretrial motion 
or proceeding necessary to prepare a case for trial. 
Id. 
42. 603 F.2d at 1254. 
43. See notes 60-130 infra and accompanying text. 
44. Judge Swygert defined de novo as the "independent weighing of each situ­
ation as it existed at the time prior to a given ruling ... with an independent judg­
ment reached and then matched against that made by the magistrate." 603 F.2d at 
1255. 
45. [d. 
46. Id. at 1252. 
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the majority's assertions, however, the 1976 amendments to the 
Magistrates Act did not expressly sanction the procedure allowing 
magistrates to preside over federal civil trialS. 47 The purpose of the 
1976 amendments was to clarify and further define assignable addi­
tional duties after numerous judicial setbacks to magistrate expan­
sion. 48 The congressional intent, rather than abnegating judicial 
power, was for the magistrate to assist the district court. 49 For ex­
ample, by assisting the judge in pretrial and preliminary matters, 
the magistrate would facilitate "the ultimate and final exercise of 
the adjudicatory function at the trial of the case. "50 The mandate 
was clear that magistrates would facilitate the adjudicatory process 
by relieving judges of some non-article III functions, but not the 
central duty of presiding at trials. 51 
Absent any clear legislative support52 for magistrate jury trials, 
the majority was forced to rely on the broad language of section 
636(b)(3)53 of the Act which shows a congressional intent to dele­
gate to magistrates additional duties not inconsistent with the Con­
stitution or laws of the United States. The 1976 amendments en­
courage the district courts to continue innovative experiments54 
47. Subsequent to Muhich, however, Congress expanded the jurisdiction of 
magistrates to include their presiding at civil trials upon the consent of the parties. 
See note 3 supra. 
48. See H.R. REP., supra note 40, at 2, 5, reprinted in [1976] 5 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS at 6162, 6165. The Report expresses the congressional intent to 
overrule the holdings in several restrictive cases. See Wingo V. Wedding, 418 U.S. 
461 (1974) (magistrate could not hold evidentiary hearing in a habeas corpus pro­
ceeding; a judge must preside); Ingram v. Richardson, 471 F.2d 1268 (6th Cir. 1972) 
(no power in magistrate to review the Secretary of Health, Education & Welfare de­
nial of social security benefits and to make proposals to district judges on the facts 
and the law); TPO, Inc. v. McMillen, 460 F.2d at 348 (motion to dismiss). 
49. H.R. REP., supra note 40 at 7, reprinted in [1976] 5 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
AD. NEWS at 6167. 
50. Id. 
51. See United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 576 F.2d 852, 853 (8th Cir. 1978) 
(purpose of Magistrates Act was to provide a method to relieve judges of some of 
their non-article III functions); Taylor v. Oxford, 575 F.2d at 154 (adjudicatory power 
over dispositive motions was to be executed only by judges); 460 F.2d at 359 (sec­
tion 636(b) cannot be read in derogation of the fundamental responsibility of judges 
to decide the cases before them). 
52. The Muhich court, by implication, indicated the lack of legislative support 
by failing to allude to legislative history. 603 F.2d at 1251. 
53. Id. at 1251-52. 
54. "If district judges are willing to experiment with the assignment to magis­
trates of other functions in aid of the business of the courts, there will will be in­
creased time available to judges for the careful and unhurried performance of their 
vital and traditional adjudicatory duties ...." H.R. REP., supra note 40, at 12, re­
printed in [1976] 5 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS at 6172. The Taylor court while 
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unrestricted by other specific grants of authority to magistrates. 
The examples given, however, are merely administrative,55 and not 
adjudicatory responsibilities. This assignment of additional duties is 
to aid judges in the administrative functions of the courts rather 
than to replace them in their traditional functions. 56 Section 
636(b)(4)57 requires the district court judges to establish rules gov­
erning these additional duties. While the Muhich court relies on 
this section58 to validate the reference under the existing Local 
Rule 38, Congress simply intended this section to give notice to lit­
igants or to equalize magistrate workloads rather than to expand ju­
risdiction to magistrates. 59 Consequently, Judge Swygert is correct 
in his conclusion that the Magistrates Act of 1976 does not ex­
pressly sanction civil trials by magistrates. Therefore, before this 
adjudicatory procedure may be implied from the Act, it is neces­
sary to determine whether the procedure is consistent with article 
III of the United States Constitution. 
IV. THE CONSTITUTION 
Article III of the United States Constitution requires that the 
judicial power of the United States be exercised by article III 
judges. 60 While some delegation of power to non-article III judges 
has been approved,61 this delegation must not be so excessive as to 
constitute an abnegation of the judicial power. 62 In Muhich, the 
interpreting this language stated that "[i]nnovative experiments may be admirable, 
and considering the heavy caseloads in the district courts, understandable, but exper­
iments must stay within the limitations of the statute." 575 F.2d at 154. 
55. H.R. REP., supra note 40, at 12, reprinted in [1976] 5 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
AD. 	NEWS at 6172. 
This subsection (636(b)(3)) would permit, for example, a magistrate to re­
view default judgments, order the exoneration or forfeiture of bonds in crim­
inal cases, and accept returns of jury verdicts where the trial judge is un­
available. This subsection would also enable the court to delegate some of 
the more administrative functions to a magistrate.... 
ld. 
56. ld. 
57. See note 3 supra. 
58. 603 F.2d at 1251. 
59. H.R. REP., supra note 40, at 13, reprinted in [1976] 5 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
AD. NEWS at 6173. 
60. See 603 F.2d at 1251. See generally Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 
561 (1962); Silberman, Masters and Magistrates Part II: The American Analogue, 50 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1297, 1304 (1975). 
61. Section 636(b)(I)(A) permits magistrates to hear pretrial matters with stated 
exceptions. Subsection (B) permits evidentiary hearings and motions for post trial re­
lief to be held by the magistrate. See also note 88 infra. 
62. Hill v. Jenkins, 603 F.2d 1255 (7th Cir. 1979); Reed v. Board of Election 
Comm'rs, 459 F.2d 121 (1st Cir. 1972). 
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Seventh Circuit held that the delegation of trial jurisdiction to 
Magistrate Meyers was within the realm of judicial authority. The 
court relied on the voluntary consent of the parties and a properly 
administered de novo review to support its assertion that constitu­
tional requirements were satisfied. 63 There are potential problems, 
however, both legal and practical, which influence the constitution­
ality and desirability of such delegations in Muhich and in future 
applications. These problems include the validity and voluntariness 
of the consent given, the actual scope of the de novo review, and 
the integrity of the judicial system itself. 
A. Consent 
Courts have differed in their analysis of exactly how consent 
by the parties enlarges the trial jurisdiction of magistrates. Some 
courts have considered trials before magistrates as an extension of 
the parties' right to consent to adjudication before a forum other 
than an article III court. 64 It is not disputed that parties have the 
freedom, without violation of article III, to consent to adjudication 
by an arbitrator. 65 This approach, however, has not been widely 
accepted since the magistrate is not part of a private dispute reso­
lution process, but rather is a judicial officer in the public aegis of 
the United States district court system. 66 As a part of this frame­
work, the public maintains an interest in the controversy from a 
precedential viewpoint, quite unlike the private nature of arbitra­
tion in which decisions are not necessarily used as a basis from 
which to decide subsequent issues. 
Magistrate trial jurisdiction also may be invoked under the 
consent provision of section 636(b)(2) which allows magistrates to 
serve as special masters. 67 Congress has expressly given litigants an 
option of choosing a magistrate to serve as a specialized factfinder 
63. See notes 64-126 infra. 
64. 520 F.2d at 505. See Gelfgren v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 451 F. Supp. 
1229 (C.D. Cal. 1978) (the constitution does not prevent references to magistrates 
for final judgment any more than it prevents the parties from choosing binding arbitra­
tion). See also Comment, Adjudicative Role for Federal Magistrates in Civil 
Cases, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 584 (1973). 
65. See Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. 344 (1854); Butler Products Co. v. Unistrut 
Corp., 367 F.2d 733 (7th Cir. 1966). 
66. 603 F.2d at 1251, 1253. 
67. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(2) (1976). In Sick v. City of Buffalo, N.Y., 574 F.2d 689 
(2d Cir. 1978), the court assumed that the reference was properly made to a magis­
trate as a special master and that the jury trial was proper after the parties consented. 
ld. at 689-90. 
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when the parties consent. 68 While a previous limitation69 on the 
use of special masters was abolished by the 1976 Magistrates Act, 70 
there do remain serious restrictions on their use. Congress in­
tended that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, other than Rule 
53(b) in special circumstances,71 would apply to references to mag­
istrates serving as masters. Rule 53 contains "many important rules 
governing the powers of masters, the conduct of proceedings be­
fore them, and the submission of reports. "72 For example, Rule 
53(e)(4) commands that the effect of a master's report is the same 
regardless of whether the parties have consented to the referral. 73 
Therefore, while consent can invoke magistrate jurisdiction as a 
special master, it cannot relieve a magistrate of limitations imposed 
upon him when acting as a judge. 
The most prolific use of consent to gain jurisdiction has been 
the consensual reference of magistrates under the additional duties 
section of the Magistrates Act. 74 Consensual reference as a basis for 
supplying magistrates with trial jurisdiction received strong support 
in DeCosta. 75 There, the court held that parties may consent to 
having a magistrate preside over a jury trial and make an initial de­
cision subject to district court review if one party contends that the 
magistrate's decision is clearly erroneous. 76 DeCosta has been cited 
with general approval by the courts,77 Congress78 and commenta­
68. There are, however, limitations to a reference under this section. For exam­
ple, magistrates cannot enter final judgments. Kendell v. Davis, 569 F.2d 1330 (5th 
Cir. 1978). 
69. In La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 259 (1957), the Supreme 
Court held that references to special masters were justified only in "exceptional cir­
cumstances." FED. R. CIV. P. 53(b). 
70. See H.R. Rep., supra note 40, at 12, reprinted in [1976] 5 U.S. CODE CONGo 
& AD. NEWS at 6172. 
71. The Congress exempted Rule 53(b) when the parties consent under 28 
U.S.c. § 636(b)(2) (1976). The exception is a legislative overruling of the restrictive 
decision in La Buy V. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957). 
72. H.R. REP., supra note 40, at 12, reprinted in [1976] 5 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
AD. NEWS at 6172. 
73. See Duryea V. Third Northwestern Nat'l Bank, 602 F.2d 809 (8th Cir. 1979). 
74. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) (1976). See generally Silberman, supra note 60; Note, 
Federal Magistrates and the Implications of Consensual References, 4 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 129 (1975); Comment, supra note 64; Note, supra note 3. 
75. 520 F.2d at 499. 
76. [d. at 508. 
77. Horton V. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 590 F.2d 403, 404 (1st Cir. 1979); 
Small v. Olympic Prefabricators, Inc., 588 F.2d 287, 292 (9th Cir. 1978). But cf. 
Taylor V. Oxford, 575 F.2d at 154 n.5 (consent of the parties is provided for in the 
statute only for special masters indicating that Congress considered consent favor­
able in one situation but not in other circumstances). 
78. See S. 1613, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). 
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tors.79 The Muhich court also relied on DeCosta. In effect, how­
ever, it departed from DeCosta in several significant respects, 80 
with the major difference being the scope of the consensual refer­
ence. DeCosta expressly prohibited even a clearly worded consen­
sual reference that purported to bind the parties finally to the mag­
istrate's rulings of law. 81 Dr. Muhich consented to precisely that 
which DeCosta prohibits, entry of final judgment by a magistrate. 
The Muhich majority found significance in the initial consent and 
chose to disregard the invalid portion of the reference. 82 
By exceeding the scope of DeCosta, the court in Muhich indi­
cates a strong preference faVOring expansion of the magistrate's role 
once the parties have given their initial consent. Another indication 
of this judicial preference is found in the court's reliance on Local 
Rule 38 which provides for the delegation of jury trials to magis­
trates. 83 These local rules are promulgated by the district court 
judges in an attempt to alleviate their trial burdens when litigants 
are willing to consent to magistrates as a substitute. Consent appar­
ently mitigates the infirmities behind excessive delegation84 and 
judges have increasingly employed this waiver.85 There are, how­
ever, important limitations on consent as the basis of subject mat­
ter jurisdiction. Judge Swygert's contention that consent cannot 
cure or waive subject matter jurisdictional requirements has re­
ceived some support,86 but this argument has been discounted 
by one commentator who asserts that article III rights can be 
79. See H.R. REP., supra note 40, at 12, reprinted in [1976] 5 U.S. CODE CONGo 
& AD. NEWS at 6172. 
80. The Muhich court recognized that magistrates are judicial officers within 
the control of the district judge. 603 F.2d at 1251. The Decosta court erroneously an­
alyzed consensual reference as though it presented a litigant a choice between two 
tribunals with overlapping jurisdiction, rather than between two adjudicators of the 
same tribunal. See Note, supra note 3, at 147 n.132. 
81. 520 F.2d at 408. 
82. 603 F.2d at 1250. 
83. [d. at 1251. 
84. "Consent partially safeguards the individual's interest in neutral and expert 
adjudication and it seems to preserve his right to ... a "trial before a tenured adjudi­
cator. At the same time, it relieves judges of part of the onus of engaging in a 'juris­
diction' balancing of values prior to reference." Note, supra note 3, at 1049. 
85. In 1978, 540 civil trials were conducted by magistrates pursuant to consent 
by the parties, representing a 66.2% increase over the number of trials conducted by 
magistrates in 1977. [1978] AD. OFF. U.S. CTS. ANN. REP. 138 (table 69). In 1979, 
570 civil trials were conducted by magistrates. [1979] AD. OFF. U.S. CTS. ANN. REP. 
10 (table 10). 
86. See H.R. REP. No. 1364, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-4, 38 (1978) (dissenting 
views of Rep. R. Drinan and Rep. T. Kindness). 
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waived. 87 A more significant limitation on consent has been the in­
ability to confer jurisdiction on magistrates to enter final judgments 
appealable directly to the courts of appeals. 88 Parties may consent 
to initial decisions by magistrates, but the courts have applied 
Mathews to preclude delegation of such a fundamental and exclu­
sive article III power as the entry of final judgment by magistrates. 
This judicial reluctance to delegate final judgment authority dem­
onstrates one area in which consent is generally inadequate in 
conferring subject matter jurisdiction. 
Regardless of the validity of consent in conferring jurisdiction, 
there are pressures from the system which adversely influence the 
voluntariness of consent. Litigants may not want, nor be in a posi­
tion,89 to wait two to three years for a judge when a magistrate is 
available for trial within three months. 90 There are also internal 
pressures influencing consent. As explained previously,91 there is a 
strong judicial preference to use magistrates in expanded ways. 92 
87. Silberman, supra note 60, at 1350-51. In support the author states: 
[N]othing in the first section of article III, which vests the judicial power 
of the United States in the courts and provides for life tenure of judges, in­
separably links the exercise of particular subject matter jurisdiction set up in 
that article, to the presiding officer. It is the court, not the judge, to which 
doctrines of subject matter jurisdiction apply. Thus, the Constitution sup­
plies no subject matter jurisdictional provision barring magistrates from 
exercising article III judicial power with the parties' consent. 
Id. 
88. Harding v. Kurco, Inc., 603 F.2d 813 (10th Cir. 1979); Horton v. State St. 
Bank & Trust Co., 590 F.2d 403 (1st Cir. 1979); Small v. Olympic Prefabricators, 
Inc., 588 F.2d 287 (9th CiT. 1978); Cason v. Owen, 578 F.2d 572 (5th Cir. 1978); 
Taylor v. Oxford, 575 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1978); Sick v. City of Buffalo, N.Y., 574 F.2d 
689 (2d Cir. 1978); Swanson & Yongdale, Inc. v. Seagrave Corp., 542 F.2d 1008 (8th 
Cir. 1976). See note 143 infra. But see Gelfgren v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 451 
F. Supp. 1229, 1330 (C.D. Cal. 1978) (district judge allowed entry of final judgement 
by the magistrate). 
89. Also, there has been concern that magistrates might become poor people's 
judges. See Note, supra note 3, at 1052 nn. 61-63. 
90. Telephone conversation with the office of United States Magistrate 
Kenneth J. Meyers. These figures are indicative of the congestion in the federal 
court system. There were over 19,089 civil cases pending over three years on June 
30, 1979, representing an all time high. 1979 AD. OFF. U.S. CTS. ANN. REP. 81-83 
(table 39). 
91. See note 83 supra. 
92. [1979] AD. OFF. U.S. CTS. ANN. REP. 11. 
United States magistrates now assist the district judges in expediting 
civil and criminal litigation in the great majority of the 92 district courts cov­
ered by the Federal Magistrates Act. During the 12-month period ended 
June 30, 1979, for example, magistrates in 74 districts filed written reports 
and recommendations for disposition of 12,062 prisoner petitions. Magis­
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Local Rule 38 employed in Muhich is similar to previous attempts 
to delegate final judgment authority to magistrates. While each of 
these previous attempts has been invalidated as excessive,93 the 
policies behind the rules clearly show that district court judges rely 
on magistrates to a large extent and that the judges are not hesitant 
to delegate even traditional functions such as trial jurisdiction. 
Another pressure influencing the voluntariness of consent is 
the potential for subtle coercion by the judiciary to encourage con­
sent in an attempt to either promote judicial economy94 or avoid pre­
siding over certain types of litigation. 95 The DeCosta court suggested 
a procedure to insulate the identities of the parties after realizing 
that a harried court might subtly coerce parties to consent to a trial 
by magistrate. 96 A by-product of the coercion problem is that judges 
may unintentionally become predisposed against a nonconsenting 
litigant, which could adversely influence the result in a close case. 
The Muhich opinion failed to discuss the need for these safeguards, 
unjustly assuming that there would be complete voluntariness on 
trates conducted 24,231 civil pretrial conferences for the judges in 77 dis­
tricts. In 77 districts they reviewed 34,311 motions in civil cases, of which 
4,361 were dispositive matters in which magistrates submitted full reports 
and recommended decisions under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(I)(B). In addition, 
magistrates filed reports and recommendations on 4,074 social security ap­
peals in 68 districts. 
Id. Thi's trend is especially true when the parties consent since the court is relieved 
from the jurisdictional balancing before referring the matter to a magistrate. See note 
83 supra. Moreover, the influx of local rules promulgated by the district judges, 
which give magistrates unlimited discretion, indicate the confidence that district 
judges have in these magistrates. Harding v. Kurco, Inc., 603 F.2d 813 (10th CiT. 
1979); Horton v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 590 F.2d 403 (1st CiT. 1979); Small v. 
Olympic Prefabricators, Inc., 588 F.2d 287 (9th CiT. 1978); Cason v. Owen, 578 F.2d 
572 (5th CiT. 1978); Taylor v. Oxford, 575 F.2d 152 (7th CiT. 1978); Sick v. City of 
Buffalo, N.Y., 574 F.2d 689 (2d Cir. 1978); Swanson & Yongdale, Inc. v. Seagrave 
Corp., 542 F.2d 1008 (8th CiT. 1976). 
93. See note 92 supra. 
94. TPO, Inc. v. McMillen, 460 F.2d 348, 360 n.62 (7th CiT. 1972) (the danger 
of coerced consent is real); United States v. Eastmount Shipping Corp., 62 F.R.D. 
437, 440 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (judge expressed suprise and regret over Department of 
Justice rule stating that "neither calendar congestion nor complexity of an issue in­
volved justifies reference of a case to a special master"); see Comment, supra note 
64, at 587-88 (suggesting incentives to gain consent). 
95. See Note, supra note 3, at 1052. (1979 house bill required case by case ref­
erence decisions to insure that district courts will not stigmatize categories of liti­
gants as undeserving of the attention of article III judges). 
96. 520 F.2d at 507 (suggesting a "blind" procedure "requiring that parties file 
with the clerk of the court a letter of consent to have a magistrate render a decision 
in the case with the clerk being bound not to disclose the identity of any who 
consent or who withhold consent."). See H.R. REP. No. 287, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 
(1979) (dissenting view of Rep. E. Holtzman). 
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the part of the parties. Instead, the court relied on the availability 
of de novo review as an adequate safeguard to solve any procedural 
deficiencies which may arise. 97 
B. De Novo Review 
The United States Supreme Court has clearly mandated that 
the authority and responsibility for informed and final determina­
tions must remain with the judge. 98 Thus, the Muhich court prop­
erly recognized the necessity of conducting a review as a method 
to correct possible improper rulings and to avoid constitutional dif­
ficulties. 99 The critical issue in Muhich, however, involves not the 
availability of de novo review, but rather the nature and scope of 
Chief Judge Foreman's actual review in the district court. 
In the 1976 amendments to the Federal Magistrates Act, Con­
gress redefined de novo review as it pertains to judicial review of 
magistrate findings. 10o Congress did not intend for a de novo re­
view to require the judge actually to conduct a new hearing on 
each contested issue. Rather, the district court judge, in making 
his determination, was directed to give fresh consideration to those 
issues to which specific objection had been. made. 101 In Muhich, 
Magistrate Meyers filed a report which became the focus of the de 
novo review. His findings and recommendations carried only such 
97. For example, note the court's reliance on de novo review to cure the par­
tially invalid local rule. See note 17 supra. 
98. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 269-70 (1976). 
99. 603 F.2d at 1250 (citing Sick v. City of Buffalo, N.Y., 592 F.2d 689, 692-93 
(2d Cir. 1978)). 
100. H.R. REP. supra note 40, at 30, reprinted in (1976) 5 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
AD. NEWS at 6163. 
101. Id: The report adopted to a great extent the approach used in Campbell v. 
United States Dist. Court, 501 F.2d 196 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 879 (1974). 
In Campbell, the court stated: 
If neither party contests the magistrate's proposed findings of fact, the court 
may assume their correctness and decide the motion on the applicable law. 
The district court, on application, shall listen to the tape recording of the ev­
idence and the proceedings before the magistrate and consider the magis­
trate's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court shall 
make a de novo determination of the facts and the legal conclusions to be 
drawn therefrom. Finally, the court may accept, reject or modify the pro­
posed findings or may enter new findings .... 
501 F.2d at 206-07. 
The cases are in harmony with the view that the district courts must review the 
magistrate's record de novo, but the scope of that review is unclear. One case sug­
gests that this might vary depending upon the expertise of the magistrate and other 
circumstances when no formal objection has been filed. Webb v. Califano, 468 F. 
Supp. 825 (E.D. Cal. 1979) (objection filed after a ten day statutory period). 
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weight as their merits warranted under the discretion of Chief 
Judge Foreman. The judge considered these findings under the 
standard requiring them to be supported by the evidence and law 
applicable thereto before entering final judgment for the defen­
dants. On appeal, the Muhich majority was satisfied that the extent 
of this de novo procedure' was sufficient under the Federal Magis­
trates Act's guidelines. 
Judge Swygert's dissenting opinion that the same de novo re­
view upheld by the majority was a mere rubber stamp102 illustrates 
the real dangers inherent in this de novo procedure. There are 
pressures influencing the independence of a district court judge's 
review which place him in a precarious position. If he chooses to 
disregard the magistrate's recommendation, he may be required to 
hear witnesses personally to insure the integrity of the fact-find­
ing process. loa But if he conducts too extensive a review, judicial 
economy is sacrificed. 104 Conversely, the judge may hesitate to dis­
turb the factfinder without such an extensive review since jury de­
cisions are not to be lightly set aside. 105 The result is a strong pos­
sibility that the de novo review becomes merely a search for 
evidence in support of the magistrate's given conclusion, rather 
than an independent search for the proper conclusion. While the 
Supreme Court has rejected this assumption,106 several cases indi­
cate that the possibility of a cursory or even no review is quite 
real. 107 The Seventh Circuit has already remanded a case for abuse 
of a district court judge's discretion in applying the Muhich stan­
102. 603 F.2d at 1253. Judge Swygert contended that the judge failed to exer­
cise a de novo review but in fact "devolved it upon the magistrate and retained 
merely the power to conduct an administrative, appellate review in the broadest 
sense." Id. at 1255. Cf. Noorlander v. Ciccone, 489 F.2d 642, 648 (8th. Cir. 1973) 
(judge will personally take testimony of witnesses and determine credibility on de 
novo review of material issues of fact.) 
103. In United States v. Bergera, 512 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1975), the Ninth Cir­
cuit held that the district court erred when it set aside the magistrate's recommenda­
tion and ruled on the motion to suppress without hearing the evidence of the motion 
itself. Id. at 394. Judge Cambers, dissenting, rejected the court's proposition, stating 
that "if the district judge wants to approve the magistrate, he may stamp it 'ap­
proved', but if he doubts the wisdom he must conduct a hearing de novo." Id. at 395. 
See also United States v. Raddatz, 592 F.2d 976 (7th Cir.), cen. granted, 444 U.S. 
824 (1979) (No. 79-8). 
104. Webb v. Califano, 468 F. Supp. 825, 830-31 (E.D. Cal. 1979) (de novo may 
become counterproductive if required too often). 
105. 603 F.2d at 1255. 
106. See Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. at 274 ("we categorically reject the sug­
gestion that judges will accept, uncritically, the recommendation of magistrates.") 
107. See note III infra. 
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dards. In Hill v. Jenkins, 108 the district court judge referred to a 
magistrate the task of conducting evidentiary hearings at a prison. 
These hearings, in effect, became a trial on the merits when argu­
ments were heard from both sides. The case was remanded be­
cause the judge adopted verbatim the findings of fact and conclu­
sions of law without even the benefit of the transcript. 109 Hill 
demonstrates that district court judges may automatically presume 
that the magistrate's findings are correct. Relying on this presump­
tion, some judges have occasionally neglected to conduct reviews, 
even over the objection of the parties. 110 These abnegations of 
judicial power, however, have consistently been invalidated by 
higher courts. 111 
A second major problem frequently associated with the admin­
istration of the de novo review is the lack of any real access to an 
article III judge. 112 The district court judge does retain jurisdic­
tion, but it "is ... exercised [indirectly] through the medium of 
the magistrate. "113 Whenever the parties consent to referral to a 
magistrate, the magistrate assumes complete control of the entire 
proceedings. The judge, in effect, remains insulated114 from the lit­
igants but for the official record. As a result, the judge serves es­
sentially an appellate function, while the verdict itself is shaped by 
the immediate events occurring before the magistrate. 11S Chief 
108. 603 F.2d at 1256. The district judge adopted the findings of appellee 
prison officials, rather than the magistrate, since no report and recommendation was 
ever filed. Material deficiencies also included the lack of consent to the procedure 
and the absence of a local rule permitting a magistrate to preside over civil trials. [d. 
at 1258-59. 
109. [d. at 1258. 
110. Orland v. United States, 602 F.2d 207 (9th Cir. 1979) (where federal pris­
oner filed written objections to magistrate's report the district court erred in not mak­
ing a de novo determination of contested findings). 
111. Reed v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 459 F.2d 121 (1st Cir. 1972). The 
court held that court approval of a magistrate memorandum which transformed pre­
liminary hearing into a case on the merits was an abnegation of judicial authority en­
tirely contrary to the provisions of article III. See also Rainha v. Cassidy, 454 F.2d 
207 (1st Cir. 1972). 
112. See text accompanying notes 121-126 infra for a discussion of the prob­
lems associated with the lack of access to an article III judge. 
113. 603 F.2d at 1251 (quoting TPO, Inc. v. McMillen, 460 F.2d 348, 353 (7th 
Cir. 1972)). 
114. In Horton v. State St. Bank, 590 F.2d 403 (1st Cir. 1979) the court, in dis­
cussing final judgment by magistrates, stated "we cannot overlook the pressures to 
acquiesce in this procedure which could develop over time, thereby effectively 
depriving litigants of trials before an Article III court." [d. at 404. See 460 F.2d at 
361 n.67 (dual role imposed on judges). See generally Note, supra note 3, at 1051-55. 
115. 603 F.2d at 1255. (events are controlled in. a significant part by the magis­
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Judge Wise, when referring the case to Magistrate Meyers, recog­
nized the importance that testimony of the parties' credibility 
would assume in the case's outcome since crucial facts were in 
dispute.1l6 Testimony of witnesses presented in the official record 
may give impressions contrary to those derived from personal ob­
servations.1l7 The Supreme Court has acknowledged that proce­
dures used at trial may be as important as the substantive law in 
influencing a decision.llS In Muhich, however, Chief Judge Fore­
man did not actively participate in the adjudication of the matter. 
Instead, Magistrate Meyers presided over the trial and made deci­
sions which influenced the outcome.1l9 While the de novo record 
review theoretically served as a check to insure the compliance 
with the evidence and law adduced at trial,120 the lack of real ac­
cess to an article III judge indicates a serious limitation dimin­
ishing the effectiveness of this bifurcated procedure. 
C. Integrity. of the Judicial System 
A major issue not addressed in the Muhich opllllon concerns 
the effect of magistrate trials on the overall integrity of the judicial 
system. 121 Constitutional reservations have been expressed at each 
trate's rulings). Judge Levin, in Senate Hearings for the 1968 Act, maintained that 
the judge should conduct the pretrial proceedings to become familiar with the issues 
prior to trial. In addition, he stated that in practicing before a master, "you do not get 
a judge, you get the judicial determination of a master." 460 F.2d at 356 n.50. 
116. Appellant's Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing in Banc at 12. 
117. United States v. Bergera, 512 F.2d 391, 393 (9th Cir. 1975); United States 
v. Page, 302 F.2d 81, 84 (9th Cir. 1962) (judges tend to forget that the testimony of a 
witness presented in an official record may make an impression contrary to that 
which was revealed at trial). See also Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U.S. 461 (1974). The 
invalidity of a local rule transfering the matter to a magistrate was not cured by its 
provision that the judge shall hear the testimony and review de novo since the pro­
cedure is not the equivalent of the judge's own exercise of the function as trier of 
fact. Id. at 473. 
118. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) states: 

To experienced lawyers it is commonplace that the outcome of a lawsuit and 

hence the vindication of legal rights depends more often on how the fact­

finder appraises the facts than on a disputed construction of a statute or in­

terpretation of a line of precedents. Thus the procedures by which the facts 

of the case are determined assume an importance fully as great as the valid­

ity of the substantive rule of law to be applied. 

Id. at 520. 
119. 603 F.2d at 1255. The major portion of appellant's brief was concerned 
not with the magistrate issue, but with substantive allegations against specific rulings 
by the magistrate. Brief for Appellant at 34-45. 
120. Sick v. City of Buffalo, N.Y., 592 F.2d 689, 692 (2d Cir. 1978). 
121. Judge Swygert acknowledged the issue, but he did not elaborate on the 
matter. 603 F.2d at 1256. See generally Silberman, supra note 60, at 1304-18 
nn.42-145; Note, supra note 3, at 1030-37. 
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stage of magistrate expansion122 centering on the delegation of ju­
dicial authority to non-article III judges. The major objection is 
that magistrates should not exercise the judicial power to preside 
over jury trials without the traditional safeguards deemed necessary 
to preserve the independence of the judiciary.123 The premise be­
hind this objection is that magistrates are materially distinguishable 
from article III judges in several critical respects which may influ­
ence their ability to perform adjudicatory duties effectively. Unlike 
judges, magistrates do not enjoy the protections of life tenure and 
undiminishable salary.124 Moreover, differences in the selection 
processes, experience and expertise indicate that judges are better 
qualified than magistrates in the task of conducting a trial. 125 
Three separate lines of analysis have been offered to counter 
these concerns. 126 First, the magistrates act merely as an adjunct 
of the district court which appoints and exerts control over them. 
When a magistrate tries a case, jUrisdiction remains vested in the 
district court and is simply exercised through the medium of the 
magistrate. While theoretically sound, this argument fails to con­
sider the practical problems in devolving such an important task as 
presiding at a jury trial. As discussed previously, the actual control 
over the magistrate may be less than complete. 127 Second, consent 
122. See, e.g., TPO, Inc. v. McMillen, 460 F.2d 348, 352-54 (7th Cir. 1972), for 
a survey of judicial and legislative reservations to the 1968 Federal Magistrates Act. 
For adverse comment on the 1976 amendments, see H.R. REP., supra note 40, at 8, 
reprinted in (1976) 5 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS at 6168. For criticism of the 
1979 amendments, see H.R. REP. No. 287, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1979) (dissenting 
view of Rep. F. Sensenbrenner, Jr.) ("In my view this bill is unconstitutional.") 
123. The waiver of the right to an article III judge is a waiver to the right to an 
adjudicator enjoying the constitutional protections of office. Note, supra note 3, at 
1030 n.40. Alexander Hamilton noted: "In the general course of human nature, a 
power over a man's substance amounts to a power over his will." (emphasis in the 
original). THE FEDERALIST No. 79, at 497 (B. Wright ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton). See 
also Horton v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 590 F.2d 403 (1st Cir. 1979). The court 
stated that "without questioning the high caliber of magistrates, in this and other cir­
cuits, nor the vital function they serve, we cannot ignore that the procedures for ap­
pointing and removing magistrates, their tenure, and the part-time status of some of 
them materially distinguish magistrates from Article III judges." Id. at 404. 
124. Magistrates are appointed by a concurrence of a majority of the district 
court's judges, with the primary requirement that appointees be members of the bar 
in good standing. 28 U.S.C. §§ 631(a), (b)(l) (1976). See note 146 infra for additional 
1979 standards. 
125. Note, supra note 3, at 1026 n.18. {"the typical new magistrate would be a 
younger lawyer with five to ten years experience...."). 
126. Hearings on S. 3475 Before the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judi­
cial Machinery of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 246 
(1966) reprinted in TPO, Inc. V. McMillen, 460 F.2d at 353. See also H.R. REP. No. 
287, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1979). 
127. See notes 102-120 supra and accompanying text. 
542 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2:523 
is a prerequisite' to invoking magistrate jurisdiction. A voluntary 
and knowledgeable consent may mitigate several constitutional con­
cerns since the parties waive their right to adjudication before an 
article III judge, but this consent is unlikely to be truly volun­
tary.128 Third, in all instances, an appeal from a magistrate's deci­
sion lies in an article III court. This argument is the most persua­
sive since it preserves for the parties the right to a constitutional 
judge with life tenure and undiminishable salary.129 As explained 
previously,130 however, the scope of the appellate function differs 
significantly from that of the trial function. Thus, the problems as­
sociated with the use of non-article III judges remain at the trial 
stage. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF MAGISTRATE JURY TRIALS 
The Supreme Court has not yet addressed the constitutionality 
of the magistrate system. The Mathews Court noted,131 but refused 
to consider, these broad constitutional issues. As a consequence of 
the Supreme Court's silence in this area, analysis has centered 
around earlier decisions132 concerning article I judges to answer 
the question of whether article III judges were intended to exer­
cise their powers exclusively.133 While factual determinations by 
non-article III officers do not impermissibly invade the judicial do­
main,134 vigorous opposition has been voiced against delegation of 
decisionmaking authority to nonconstitutional judicial officers. 135 
As magistrate jurisdiction expands, the Supreme Court un­
doubtedly will be forced to decide the parameters of the magis­
128. See notes 89-97 S1Jpra and accompanying text. 
129. See Silberman, supra note 60, at 1304-21, 1349-60. 
130. See notes 112-120 supra and accompanying text. 
131. 423 U,S. at 269 n.5. 
132. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932), This landmark case established 
that "there is no requirement that, in order to maintain the essential attributes of 
judicial power, all determinations of fact in constitutional courts shall be made by 
judges." ld.at 51. See Note, Masters and Magistrates in Federal Courts, 88 HARV. L. 
REV. 779, 787-89 (1975). The issue was raised in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 
530 (1962) (plurality), but was not resolved. The court avoided the question by 
deciding that the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals al­
ways had been article III courts, ld. at 584. 
133. Congress has established specialized 'legislative' courts and other tribu­
nals under its article I powers, These officers can preside over cases within the arti­
cle III § 2 jurisdictional field. See Glidden v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 549-51 (1962). 
134. Note, supra note 132, at 787-89. 
135. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 606 (1962) (Douglas, L dissenting); See 
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 86-87 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Cf. Palmore 
v. United States, 411 U.S, 389, 407-10 (1974) (judicial and legislative branches did not 
intend that all federal trials and decisions would be reserved for article III judges). 
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trates' authority.13S Meanwhile, Muhich is a harbinger of future 
trends which may modify the entire structure of the federal court 
system. The court overcame an invalid local rule and a long tradi­
tion restricting magistrate expansion to condone a jury trial pre­
sided over by a magistrate. TPO, Inc., 137 Taylor, 138 and United 
States v. Raddatz139 had all previously placed limits on the con­
gressional grant of power to magistrates. Yet in Muhich, the Sev­
enth Circuit found the combination of consensual reference and de 
novo review sufficient to satisfy both statutory and constitutional 
challenges. The thrust of Muhich clearly indicates that a strong pol­
icy exists supporting the expansion of magistrate jurisdiction from 
"super-notary" to "para-judge. "140 Apparently satisfied with the 
ability of magistrates to handle judicial matters other than trial,141 
the evolution of magistrates into the adjudicatory role seems a logi­
cal step in the quest to relieve the overburdened federal court sys­
tem. There is, however, an alternative solution to the congestion 
problem which precludes several infirmities associated with magis­
trate adjudication. The solution is simply to expand magistrate du­
ties in discovery, pretrial conferences and other more reviewable 
areas, such as evidentiary hearings, while restricting their use as 
judicial substitutes at trial. 142 The benefits are three-fold. First, 
judges would have more time available to exercise their 
adjudicatory roles which was the original rationale for the magis­
trate system. Second, this increased specialization in nontrial mat­
136. This point may have been reached with the passing of the 1979 Magis­
trates Act, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 631-636 (West Pamph. 1980). The new law gives magis­
trates the authority to invalidate state statutes under the constitution. See 125 CONGo 
REC. H8,725 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1979) (remarks of Rep. F. Senseubrenner). 
In addition, the need for this delegation of judicial power has been seriously 
curtailed. In 1979, Congress passed the Omnibus Judgeship Act of 1978, 28 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 44, 133 (West Cum. Supp. 1979), which added 117 new district judgeships. There 
is also a bill in Congress to abolish diversity jurisdiction. See H.R. 2202 96th Cong., 
1st Sess. (1979). These measures will curtail the judicial workload and diminish the 
need for magistrates to substitute in the presiding of trials. 
137. See note 51 supra. 
138. See note 17 supra. 
139. See note 33 supra. 
140. Cf. 423 U.S. at 268. (Supreme Court refused to attach a label to describe 
magistrates). There are, however, reservations to this expansion. "[F]inal magistrate 
adjudication would also introduce novel problems. It would entail the loss of the 
1976 de novo procedure as well as the addition of weaknesses inherent in any sys­
tem of consensual reference-risk of coerced consent, role problems, and possible in­
hibition of legal development." Note, supra note 3, at 1059. 
141. [1979] AD. OFF. U.S. CTS. ANN. REP. 10 (table 10). 
142. See Note, supra note 3, at 1061, suggesting a careful restriction of the num­
ber of matters in whic~ a magistrate may formally assume the judicial power. 
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ters would presumably increase magistrate expertise. Finally, con­
stitutional problems, and litigation concerning these, would be 
eliminated as moot. Despite this viable alternative, the pro magis­
trate expansion trend appears strong enough to continue for the 
foreseeable future. 
Congress has adopted the pro magistrate expansion policy es­
poused in Muhich in the recently passed Federal Magistrates Act 
of 1979. 143 The Act expressly allows a district court judge to refer 
jury trials to magistrates. 144 District court judges need not support 
a magistrate reference under the "additional duties" section of the 
Act. Consent stands as the lone threshold to invoking magistrate 
jurisdiction, and the Act contains strong warnings to insure the 
complete voluntariness of this consent. 145 
The magistrate selection process also has been upgraded to in­
sure competent magistrates in their new role as adjudicators. 146 
The major feature of the 1979 Act empowers magistrates to enter 
final judgments which either may be appealed to a higher court or, 
if the parties consent,147 to the district court judge. This consti­
tutes a major deviation from the Muhich procedure in which the 
district court judge retained the ultimate responsibility for the en­
try of final judgment through de novo review. This final judgment 
feature effectively overrules uniform decisions in the courts of ap­
peals148 which forbid magistrate entry of final judgment. These 
143. The 1979 Magistrate Act reads as follows: 
(c) 	 Nothwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary­
(1) 	 Upon the consent of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate 
or a part-time United States magistrate who serves as a full-time 
judicial officer may conduct any or all proceedings in a jury or non­
jury civil matter and order the entry of judgment in the case, when 
specially designated to exercise such jurisdiction by the district 
court.... 
28 U.S.C.A. § 636(c)(I) (West. Pamph. 1980). 
144. [d. 
145. 125 CONGo REC. H8,130 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1979). "The conferees felt that 
because of the possibility of coercion a strong warning should remain in the legisla­
tion that neither the judge nor the magistrate shall attempt to persuade ... any party 
to consent...." [d. 
146. [d. New positions or reappointments are contingent upon the magistrate 
having been a member of the bar of the highest court of his state for at least five 
years. 
147. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 636(c)(4) (West Pamph. 1980). 
148. Harding V. Kurco, Inc., 603 F.2d 813 (10th Cir. 1979); Horton V. State St. 
Bank & Trust Co., 590 F.2d 403 (1st Cir. 1979); Small V. Olympic Prefabricators, 
Inc., 588 F.2d 287 (9th Cir. 1978); Cason v. Owen, 578 F.2d 572 (5th Cir. 1978); 
Taylor v. Oxford, 575 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1978); Sick v. City of Buffalo, N.Y., 574 F.2d 
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cases, like Muhich, considered de novo review essential to comply 
with the limitations of Mathews and the Constitution. While the 
new Act has not been tested, there are indications from prior deci­
sions149 that the delegation of such a fundamental authority to a 
non-article III judge may be improper. The First Circuit has re­
cently concluded: "[T]he discretionary authority to enter final judg­
ment is so fundamentally an exclusive power of an Article III court 
that we are unwilling to find it within the contemplation of this 
catch-all, 'additional duties' provision."150 Likewise, the Tenth Cir­
cuit has described the final judgment authority as a fundamental 
and exclusive power of an article III judge. 151 
The crucial constitutional issue concerning the 1979 Act relates 
to the source of the judicial reluctance to sanction entry of final 
judgment by magistrates. If the reluctance stems from the former 
lack of statutory authorization152 for magistrates to enter final judg­
ment, the 1979 Act may prove to be immune from constitutional 
attack. If, however, the reluctance is rooted in the constitutional 
requirement that the judicial power of the United States shall be 
exercised by judges, the Act's constitutional foundation may prove 
to be inadequate. As previously shown,153 there are constitutional 
reservations to the Muhich procedure. The 1979 Act intensifies the 
problems faced in Muhich by eliminating the need for de novo re­
view and by allowing magistrates to enter final judgment after 
consent by the parties. 154 It is unclear whether the parameters of 
689 (2d Cir. 1978); Swanson & Yongdale, Inc. v. Seagrave Corp., 542 F.2d 1008 (8th 
Cir. 1976). 
149. See note 148 supra. Harding v. Kurco, Inc., 603 F.2d 813 (10th Cir. 1979). 
"Thus, the discretionary authority to direct entry of a final judgment is fundamental 
and exclusive power of an Article III judge" Id. at 814. (emphasis added). "[M]ain­
taining the integrity of that process requires that magistrates not be allowed to sup­
plant judges commissioned under the Constitution in the ultimate adjudication of 
controversies." Note, supra note 132, at 803. 
ISO. Horton v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 590 F.2d 403, 404 (1st Cir. 1979) 
(emphasis added). 
151. Harding v. Kurco, Inc., 603 F.2d 813 (10th Cir. 1979). But see Taylor v. 
Oxford, 575 F.2d 152, 154 n.7 (7th Cir. 1978); Sick v. City of Buffalo, N.Y., 574 F.2d 
689, 691 n.1O (2d Cir. 1978). Both acknowledge legislation in Congress that would 
permit final judgment jurisdiction to be exercised by magistrates. 
152. The Congress has tacitly admitted the lack of statutory authority in the 
former act by its passage of the 1979 Act. 
153. See notes 60-130 supra and accompanying text. 
154. See H.R. REP. supra note 86, at 38. 

The weakness of the logic of those who argue that consent cures all may be 

seen when carried to its inevitable conclusion. Under the consent theory, 

Congress could abolish all inferior Federal courts ... and replace them with 
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article III are violated by non-article III judges exercising the 
power of article III in the above manner. What is clear is that in 
1980, magistrates are performing the traditional judicial function 
of presiding at trials without the safeguards deemed essential to an 
independent judiciary, as formulated by the framers of the Con­
stitution. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The country is increasingly looking to its federal courts to 
solve important and pressing problems. Congestion and delay have 
precipitated the need for magistrates to assist the federal judges in 
solving these problems. The Muhich court recognized this need 
and fashioned a procedure that permits magistrates to preside over 
a full jury trial on the merits. 
The procedure involves initial consent by the parties pursuant 
to a local district rule and a de novo review by the district judge of 
any contested findings. Two major problems, one constitutional 
and the other practical, emerge from this procedure. The constitu­
tional problem is whether article III allows magistrates to exercise 
trial jurisdiction in a federal civil case. This infirmity is resolved 
when consent is entirely voluntary and the de novo review is exer­
cised in a manner which retains the ultimate decisionmaking power 
in the judge. The practical problems involve the difficulties in ad­
ministering the de novo review and insuring the voluntariness of 
consent. The practical problems associated with magistrate jury 
trials may not affect the constitutionality of the procedure, but they 
do influence the desirability of that process. For example, the time 
constraints affecting consent and the various definitions of de novo 
review illustrate the difficulties in administering the seemingly sim­
ple standards of Muhich. Compounding these problems is the Fed­
eral Magistrates Act of 1979. The Act reinforces the Muhich reli­
ance on consent, but it exceeds the scope of Muhich by permitting 
entry of final judgment by magistrates themselves. The Act inten­
sifies the lack of initial access to an article III judge by creating 
a new group of judicial officers. Moreover, by eliminating the de 
novo review, the Act discards the essential safeguard that the ulti­
mate decision for final judgment should remain with a judge pro-
a greatly expanded magistrate system. Litigants who desired a Federal fo­
rum would then only have to consent to appear before the magistrate . . . 
(or) sue in the State courts. We seriously doubt if the Constitution ever con­
templated such a perversion of Article III. 
ld. 
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tected by tenure and salary provisions. A more reasoned 
alternative than the Muhich or the 1979 Act's procedures for 
solving the problems of congestion and delay would be to increase 
the number of district judgeships, as was done in the Omnibus 
Judgeship Act of 1978. 155 This increase, combined with the expan­
sion of magistrate duties in nontrial areas,156 is preferable for sev­
eral reasons. It preserves the integrity of the judicial system by 
eliminating non-article III officers from the delicate task of 
presiding at jury trials. Also, it eliminates the various problems fre­
quently associated with the bifurcated process such as lack of initial 
access to a judge and duplicity of work. This approach also pro­
vides a direct solution to the congestion problem rather than an in­
direct answer through the use of non-article III judges. In the final 
analysis, if the country needs additional judges to resolve legal 
problems, the solution is to supply more article III judges rather 
than "reconditioned" substitutes. 
Salvatore D. Ferlazzo 
155. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 44, 133 (West Cum. Supp. 1979). 
156. See notes 141 & 142 supra and accompanying text. 
